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Are we all Charlie? How media priming and framing affect 
immigration policy preferences after terrorist attacks 
Abstract 
Terrorist attacks negatively affect support for immigration policy, and this has 
been linked to the extensive media coverage of terrorism. Yet, this coverage may 
also have a moderating effect. This paper uses the timing of the fielding of the 
European Social Survey, which took place during the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper 
Cacher attacks, as a natural experiment. Because the media coverage of the 
attacks varied between France and other European countries, it is possible to 
study how differences in the media framing and priming of the attacks affected 
attitudes. The expected negative effect on immigration policy preferences is 
found outside France, but not within France. This study’s findings lend support to 
a moderating effect of the media coverage of terrorist attacks, both as a framing 
effect that influenced the perceived relevance of the attacks to immigration 
attitudes and a priming effect that primed the public with tolerant French 
Republican values.  
Keywords: Terrorist attacks; immigration attitudes; priming; framing; Charlie 
Hebdo 
 
 ‘Today it is the Republic as a whole that has been attacked. The Republic equals 
freedom of expression; the Republic equals culture, creation; it equals pluralism 
and democracy’. (Hollande 2015a) 
Research on Islamic terrorism has found that terrorism negatively affects 
attitudes towards out-groups (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006; 
Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007). This has been interpreted as a consequence of 
heightened perceptions of threat after terrorist attacks (see, e.g., Huddy et al. 2002, 
2005, 2007). However, studies of terrorism’s effects on immigration policy preferences 
have found mixed evidence for a negative effect (Brouard et al. 2018; Finseraas et al. 
2011; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Moreover, 
 
 
heightened perceptions of threat do not always lead to changes in attitudes towards out-
groups (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013). For perceptions of threat to affect other attitudes, 
the threat must be relevant to the attitudes in question (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; 
Price and Tewksbury 1997). This paper asks whether the effects of terrorist attacks on 
immigration policy preferences are dependent on the type of media coverage. 
Using a novel methodological approach to natural experiments, this paper 
studies the effects of the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks in Paris in January 
2015 on immigration policy preferences in France and in five other countries. A crucial 
question is whether the attacks’ effects on immigration preferences were moderated by 
people’s exposure to different types of media coverage. The media coverage after the 
Paris attacks differed from that following earlier terrorist attacks; the international 
media framed them as attacks on free speech (Gómez-Domínguez et al. 2017), and, in 
France, the coverage of the French president’s speeches and the large Republican 
marches showed people championing French Republican values, including the value of 
tolerance (Moran 2017). This study uses the timing of the European Social Survey (ESS 
2014) to examine the effects of the terrorist attacks in a regression-discontinuity (RD) 
design. While similar studies of terrorism have been previously conducted (Finseraas et 
al. 2011; Finseraas and Listhaug 2013), this paper goes further methodologically; it 
both compares respondents within smaller geographical units and the effects in France 
with those in other countries to establish the possible moderating effects of the media 
coverage of terrorist attacks.   
This paper draws from research on media effects to understand how terrorist 
attacks impact attitudes. So far, the negative effects of terrorism on out-group attitudes 
have been explained as consequences of heightened perceptions of threat in the 
aftermath of an attack. This can be understood as a priming effect (Iyengar and Kinder 
 
 
1987), in which terrorist attacks make thoughts about terrorism more salient or 
accessible in the public’s mind. Accordingly, following an attack, terrorism receives 
more weight in evaluations, affecting attitudes that people perceive as connected to 
terrorism, such as those towards immigration policy. However, the media coverage 
often changes on multiple dimensions after terrorism incidents, possibly priming 
considerations other than solely the terrorist threat. The media, the public and the 
political leaders seldom understand the goals of terrorists, and terrorists are often seen 
as attacking ‘the nation’ or ‘the democracy’ (Abrahms 2006, 2012, 2018: chapter 4). 
Thus, the coverage of the attacks often highlights central, ‘national’ values, perceived to 
be at stake. This focus may lead to a priming of the emphasised values, making them 
both salient and accessible in post-attack considerations. 
For the increased salience of terrorism and national values to affect attitudes 
towards immigration policy, people must see terrorism and the national values as 
relevant for making judgements about the policies. In other words, there must be a 
connection between terrorism and the policies in the public’s mental schemata. This 
connection may already be present, but it may also be created or suppressed by the 
media’s coverage of an attack (Price et al. 1997; Scheufele 2004). Hence, the media 
coverage may have a framing effect on the public’s mental schemata, affecting the 
perceived applicability or relevance of terrorism to other attitudes. In sum, the effects of 
terrorism may be dependent on the amount of coverage about the attacks themselves 
(priming effect), on what other considerations (i.e., values) the coverage includes and 
emphasises (also priming effect) and on what connections are made between the attacks 
and other issues (framing effect). As the coverage inside and outside France varied 
according to these dimensions, comparing the effects inside and outside the country 
provides insights both into the effects of the attacks on immigration policy preferences 
 
 
and into the mechanisms creating these effects. 
The effects of the terrorist threat 
While terrorist attacks have detrimental consequences for the immediate victims, 
the terrorists’ main goal is to affect the broader public through the media coverage of 
the attacks. Hence, the relationship between terrorists and the media has been described 
as ‘symbiotic’. However, the media seldom works as a mere microphone for terrorists. 
It is usually unable to convey the terrorists’ goals (Abrahms 2006, 2012, 2018), often 
serving instead as a microphone for the political leadership (Wilkinson 1997) and even 
offering its own framings of attacks (Nacos et al. 2011). Yet, research on terrorism’s 
consequences for political attitudes has largely viewed the media solely as a conveyor 
of information; media coverage of terrorism has been taken for granted, and the media 
has not been assumed to have any separate role in moderating the consequences of 
terrorist attacks. 
Research on the effects of terrorism has found that people become more 
negative towards out-groups and think in terms of stereotypes after terrorist attacks and 
when perceiving terrorism as a threat (Traugott et al. 2002; Huddy et al. 2002, 2007; 
Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006; Legewie 2013; Schüller 2016).  
Terrorism has been found to increase the perceived threat to both national culture and 
security (Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007; Branton et al. 2011; Finseraas and 
Listhaug 2013), which are central determinants of immigration policy attitudes (Canetti-
Nisim et al. 2008; Bansak et al. 2016). However, there has been mixed support for an 
effect of terrorism and an effect of the perception of threat from terrorism on attitudes 
towards immigration policy (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Lahav and Courtemanche 
2012; Noelle-Neumann 2002; Huddy et al. 2005; Finseraas et al. 2011). Thus, terrorist 
attacks and perceived threats do not seem to affect attitudes towards immigration 
 
 
directly, which suggests that further study/a better understanding of the relationship 
between such attacks and immigration is required 
The priming and framing effects of terrorism 
This paper relies on the model of media effects proposed by Price and 
Tewksbury (1997), who argue that judgements are based on the most salient 
considerations that are seen as applicable to the issue. Accordingly, terrorism affects 
judgements about immigration policy if terrorism is an accessible consideration and is 
perceived as applicable or relevant to immigration policy. Modifying the equation 
presented by Chong and Druckman (2007: 107)i leads to an equation where a judgement 
is the sum of considerations, where each consideration (i) has three properties: 
accessibility (a), relevance (r) and valence (v). This gives the formula: 
!""#"$%& =()* ∗ ,* ∗ -*, 
This formula shows that considerations not deemed relevant (, = 0) will not influence 
an attitude. Following this equation, the news coverage of an attack may influence the 
accessibility (a), the relevance (r) and the valence (v) of terrorism in the public’s mind.  
As outlined below, current research has been preoccupied with how news 
coverage of terrorism increases the accessibility (a) of terrorism (i.e., priming effects) 
but not with how this coverage may affect the perceived applicability or relevance (r) of 
terrorism (i.e., framing effects). However, media coverage of terrorism may have 
consequences for both the accessibility of terrorism and other considerations and for the 
applicability of terrorism to other considerations for other judgements.ii Most research 
has viewed the effects of terrorist attacks as a consequence of an increased perception of 
terrorism threats. The effects of these perceptions may be understood as a priming effect 
 
 
— that is, that attacks make the known terrorist threat more salient. Thus, the terrorist 
threat is given more weight in related judgements (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 64). For 
priming to influence attitudes towards a policy, there must be a connection in people’s 
mental schemata between the primed terrorist threat and the respective policy (Price and 
Tewksbury 1997: 194; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 16). A priming effect for 
terrorism is contingent on people judging the terrorist threat as applicable to evaluating 
immigration policy. iii Otherwise, the terrorist threat is not deemed relevant when people 
are asked about immigration policy, and its increased salience is irrelevant for this 
judgement. 
After terrorist attacks, news reporting changes in other ways, rather than just by 
including stories about the attacks, which may lead to the priming of considerations 
other than the attacks. Often, terrorist attacks lead to broad, public, domestic backlashes, 
in which the media, politicians and public rally around central, ‘national’ values. 
Though the exact values differ according to the attack and country, examples abound. 
The 9/11 attacks in the US were described as attacks on ‘freedom’ and ‘our way of life’ 
(G. W. Bush in Rafoss 2019; Abrahms 2018: 65), the March 2005 attacks in Spain as 
attacks on the constitution and Spanish unity (Fominaya 2011; Sinkkonen 2016)iv and 
the July 2011 attacks in Norway as attacks on ‘openness’ and ‘democracy’ (Wollebæk 
et al. 2013; Jenssen and Bye 2013). The media usually covers central politicians 
extensively after terrorist attacks (at least domestically) (Kitch 2003; Schudson 2003; 
Zandberg and Neiger 2005; Thorbjørnsrud and Figenschou 2018), which may lead to a 
priming effect on particular national values.  
Accordingly, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, both the terrorist threat and 
national values may become more salient and accessible to the public. The media 
coverage after terrorism may affect judgements about issues in which the terrorist threat 
 
 
or national values are perceived as relevant considerations. However, the relevance of 
these considerations may also be affected by the media coverage through framing 
effects. The media can emphasise certain connections over others, making the terrorist 
threat and national values more or less applicable to different policy judgements 
(Cacciatore et al. 2016; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007); hence, the connection in 
people’s schemata between immigration and a terrorist attack may be affected by the 
media’s framing of the attack (Price et al. 1997; Scheufele 2004; Tewksbury and 
Scheufele 2009). As Iyengar (1987) shows, different emphasis frames of the same 
event, in this case a terrorist hijacking, affected people’s interpretation of the event’s 
cause (see also Brinson and Stohl 2009, 2012). Such different causal attributions may, 
in turn, make different policy proposals seem more or less relevant to hindering future 
attacks. Both the priming effects described above may be conditioned on framing — 
either of the terrorist attacks or of the values in question (see, e.g., Nelson et al. 2015).  
Findings from studies concerning the effects of terrorism on immigration 
preferences seem to support such a combination of priming and framing effects. 
Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) find that perceptions of terrorism threats in Europe 
increased after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, but they do not find corresponding changes in 
attitudes towards immigration policy. Pakistani terrorists, with connections to the 
Pakistani Army, perpetrated these attacks, and the relationship between the attacks and 
European immigration policy were relatively weak. Lahav and Courtemanche (2012), 
on the other hand, do find that reading about the threat of terrorism affects immigration 
attitudes. However, in their experiment the text that the respondents read about 
terrorism explicitly mentions the possible immigration of terrorists (Lahav and 
Courtemanche 2012: 501), thus describing immigration as a possible cause of terrorism. 
Hence, the results could be interpreted as dependent on this framing effect, rather than 
 
 
solely on the priming of terrorism. Studies of the July 22, 2011, attacks in Norway seem 
to support the effect of the national values also being primed. After the attacks, people 
became more positive and trusting of out-groups (Wollebæk et al. 2013; Jakobsson and 
Blom 2014), which may be attributed to the post-attack emphasis on tolerance (Solheim 
2018).  
The Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks provide an interesting test for the 
possible effects of terrorism priming and framing. The events in Paris were framed as 
attacks on free speech (Gómez-Domínguez et al. 2017), with immigration not part of 
this framing, which may have affected the connection between the attacks and 
immigration. In addition, French Republican values such as liberty, tolerance and the 
principle of laïcité (secularity) were central to both the massive demonstrations across 
France and speeches by the French political elite (Moran 2017: 318). The French media 
extensively covered these speeches and the ‘Republican marches’, possibly priming the 
French public with Republican values—including, among others, tolerance. Using data 
from the ESS 2014, it is possible to test whether these differences in priming and 
framing had consequences for attitudes towards immigration policy. 
Prior research on the effects of the attacks on immigration preferences has been 
inconclusive, though there is some support for a more tolerant reaction in France than 
what has been the norm after other attacks. The people who participated in the 
Republican marches were mostly liberal and left-wing. In an experimental setting 
before and after the attacks, Mayer and Tiberj (2016) and Nugier et al. (2016) found 
that reminding French respondents of the Republican value of colour-blind equality 
reduced the feelings of threat. Brouard et al. (2018) and Castanho Silva (2018) found no 
effect of the attacks on immigration policy preferences (in France and in Europe 
respectively). Finally, Cohu et al. (2016) and Vasilopoulos et al. (2018) found more 
 
 
standard reactions to the attacks, with increased prejudice and authoritarian attitudes 
respectively.  
The media coverage of the attacks 
On January 7, 2015, two brothers entered the offices of the satirical newspaper 
Charlie Hebdo and killed 12 and injured 11.v The fatalities included well-known 
caricaturists at the newspaper. The terrorists escaped from Paris in a car, and the 
massive manhunt that followed ended two days later in a siege of the terrorists’ hiding 
place and the storming of a kosher supermarket, where an accomplice of the brothers 
had taken several hostages. In total, 17 were killed in the two attacks, including the 
three attackers, and 22 were injured. Charlie Hebdo was targeted because it had 
published caricatures depicting the prophet Muhammad in several of its editions, and 
the terrorists thought that this was blasphemous. The supermarket was part of the Hyper 
Cacher chain of kosher supermarkets and was chosen deliberately to attack Jews.  
The attacks were covered by news media across the world, and, based on prior 
research, it could be assumed that this terrorism priming would negatively affect 
attitudes towards immigration policy. Since this priming effect depends on people being 
exposed to news of the attacks, those who lived in France, or who watched television 
news, should be expected to become more negative towards immigration than others. 
This leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: (H1a) The news coverage of the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper 
Cacher attacks made people support more restrictive immigration policies, and (H1b) 
this effect was dependent on being exposed to news of the attacks.  
As argued above, the framing of terrorist attacks may affect the extent to which 
they are perceived as relevant to political attitudes. The framing of the Charlie Hebdo 
and Hyper Cacher attacks soon converged on a free speech frame (Gómez-Domínguez 
 
 
et al. 2017), and news media across the world extensively used caricatures or memes to 
show their support for Charlie Hebdo. While terrorism coverage often follows the 
framing set by the national government, at least at the domestic level (Kitch 2003; 
Schudson 2003; Entman 2004; Zandberg and Neiger 2005), the editorial teams of 
various media outlets clearly felt directly targeted by these attacks and took an active 
role as actors in the conflict (Hjarvard and Lundby 2018: 58; Eko and Hellmueller 
2018: 18). Solidarity with the attacked editorial team and the defence of the right to free 
speech became central themes in the coverage, and news organisations repeated the 
slogan ‘Je suis Charlie’. This media framing may have suppressed the perceived 
applicability of the attacks to attitudes concerning immigration policy, creating other 
connections instead. Since framing effects are dependent on attention (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007: 14), it could be expected that the moderating influence of framing 
would be strongest for people who were more exposed to the frame—in this case, 
people who either lived in France or were watching the news more than others. This 
leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: (H2) The more that people were exposed to news of the terrorist 
attacks, the less the attacks affected their attitudes towards immigration policy. 
While the freedom of speech frame dominated the international media, the 
coverage in France included both the speeches by president Hollande and the large 
Republican marches across the country (Moran 2017). President Hollande (2015a, 
2015b, 2015c) described the attacks as assaults on the French Republic and spoke of 
‘Republican values’ in the aftermath. On January 11, four days after the attacks began in 
Paris, around four million people participated in the largest public demonstrations in 
France since World War II. The demonstrators supported the victims and their families, 
and, like the president, showed their support for Republican values, such as liberty, 
 
 
equality, fraternity, freedom of speech, tolerance and the principle of laïcité (secularity). 
Indeed, the organisers of the marches first said there was no room for Marine Le Pen, 
the leader of the anti-immigration Front National (now Rassemblement National), 
because her party ‘stigmatizes citizens because of their origin or their religion’ (Equy et 
al. 2015). This emphasis on Republican values in France after the attacks may have 
served as a priming of tolerance, motivating people to control their prejudices 
(Ivarsflaten et al. 2010; Blinder et al. 2013). The higher level of coverage in France, and 
the connection between national values and French Republicanism, probably made this 
priming more effective in France than in other countries (Shen and Edwards 2005). This 
leads to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: (H3)The effects of the attacks were less negative in France than 
in other countries, regardless of whether or not people watched the news. 
Methods and data 
Data  
This paper is based on the seventh round of the ESS (2014), conducted in some 
of the participating countries during the period surrounding the 2015 terrorist attacks on 
Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Cacher store in Paris.vi Accordingly, some of the 
respondents were interviewed before, and some after, the attacks. The timing of the 
interviews determined the respondents’ exposure to news about the terrorist attacks. 
This is leveraged as a natural experiment, as there is no reason to believe that the survey 
respondents were able to decide the timing of the interviews because of the attacks. This 
paper leverages a second causal identification strategy as well; by comparing the 
attitudinal changes in France with those in other European countries, it is possible to 




The respondents’ attitudes towards immigration policy are assumed to have the 
potential outcome 2*(,) (Cattaneo et al. 2015). 3*	is the date of the interview, and the 
position on 3* relative to the cut-off (,5), i.e., the date of the attacks, determines the 
treatment:  
6* = 1 ∗ (3* ≥ ,5) 
For a bandwidth of dates 95 = [,, ,] around the cut-off , < ,5 < , , the distribution of 
the score ,, i.e., the date, is assumed to be the same for all units. Thus, inside this 
bandwidth, the assigned dates are assumed to be randomly assigned. In addition, the 
potential outcome is assumed to depend only on the treatment and not on the date (,) 
itself: 
2*(,) = 2*=>?@A for all r. 
Thus, the individuals’ attitudes towards immigration is assumed only to be 
affected by the timing of the interview in relation to whether they experienced media 
coverage of the attacks or not. The date has no other influence on attitudes. As long as 
these assumptions hold, the difference in means between the groups interviewed before 
and after the attacks can be used to calculate the attacks’ effect.  
The key issue is then to find the bandwidth where these assumptions hold. This 
study use balance tests following the recommendations by Cattaneo et al. (2015).vii 
Only regions where these tests hold for the smallest bandwidth are used. viii The widest 
balanced bandwidth, where all smaller bandwidths are balanced, is used in each region, 
and balance is then tested in the aggregated sample using the same tests as for the 
effects (Cattaneo et al. 2015).ix To maximise the probability that the as-if-random 
assumption holds, these balance tests are run at the regional level, rather than the 
 
 
country level, because the selection of interview dates (i.e., the randomisation) probably 
happened within these smaller geographical areas. x In addition, this approach has the 
positive aspect of preventing comparisons of people from different areas of the 
countries before and after the attacks (a possible confounder) and reducing sampling 
variability (Gerber and Green 2012: 72–73). 
The regions are used as a blocked experiment, and the effects in each region are 
first aggregated to the national level and then the international level (see Gerber and 
Green 2012).xi This approach deviates from earlier studies, which have only controlled 
for country differences. As shown in table 1, there are three French regions and 10 
others that are balanced, amounting to a total of 204 French respondents and 658 
respondents from five other countries.xii To test the statistical validity of the results, 
repeated sampling inference is used (Cattaneo et al. 2015). This sampling is run at the 
regional level, and then the procedure outlined above is used to calculate the mean 
difference for each sample.xiii  
RD designs have been used in a broad range of papers on the effects of 
terrorism. However, prior studies have relied on parametrically modelling the time 
trends in the data, using types of linear or logistic regression (Finseraas et al. 2011; 
Finseraas and Listhaug 2013; Legewie 2013; Jakobsson and Blom 2014; Geys and Qari 
2017) or other types of parametrically modelling (Castanho Silva 2018). However, 
using the timing of an interview as a forcing variable differs from other types of RD 
studies because there is no reason to believe that it correlates with the dependent 
variable (which is a central issue in RD designs; see de la Cuesta and Imai 2016; Lee 
and Lemieux 2010). Accordingly, the parametric modelling is less useful in this case 
and may have problematic consequences if the relationship is not modelled correctly. In 
addition, as is shown here, other aspects of the survey design may be exploited to 
 
 
increase the plausibility of reaching causal inferences.  
International comparison 
To test the difference in effects between France and the other countries, a second 
causal identification strategy is employed. By comparing the attitudinal changes in 
France with those in other European countries, it is possible to distinguish differences in 
effects that may be caused by differences in media coverage. The difference in effects is 
the variation between the differences in means from France and the other countries. 
However, the countries included in the analyses vary in their baseline levels of support 
for immigration. Low baseline support may create a ‘flooring effect’ because people 
who are already responding on the scale’s negative extreme regarding immigration 
(here ‘Allow none’) are unable to move further in a negative direction. Thus, the 
absolute difference in means may not be a good measure in these countries, and this is 
especially problematic for comparing them with the effects in France—a country with 
higher baseline levels of support for immigration. Hence, two types of estimates are 
reported. The first is the absolute difference in means. The second is the relative 
difference in means, which is the absolute mean difference divided by the mean of the 
untreated group. This measure gives relative change in attitudes, a measure that takes 
into account the baseline support and the differences in maximum possible amount of 
change for each region. All analyses were run in R (R Core Team 2018). 
   Table 1 around here 
News use 
The moderating influence of media use was tested to try to determine the 
underlying causal mechanism of the effects of the attacks. The question of how much 
television (TV) news the respondent watches on a regular day is the only question 
 
 
concerning news exposure in the ESS. Using the balanced dataset, an OLS regression 
was run—regressing immigration policy attitudes on this variable, the balance test 
variables and a variable denoting ‘treatment’ (see above). The TV-news use variable 
was log transformed to take into account that the marginal effect is expected to be 
reduced with more TV-news use. The TV-news variable was interacted with the 
treatment variable and a variable denoting a person as being from France. It was also 
allowed to vary between the different regions. Thus, this analysis shows whether 
watching TV-news was correlated with attitudes towards immigration policy, whether 
this correlation changed after the attacks and whether these two correlations were 
different in France than in other countries. 
The results indicate a possible moderating effect of news consumption, but, 
since other factors may correlate with TV-news consumption and news consumption 
may have increased as a consequence of the attacks, this analysis is susceptible to both 
omitted variable bias and reverse causation. The results should, therefore, be treated 
with caution. Table 12 in the appendix includes tests of other variables, such as 
education, that may correlate with news consumption, and these tests do not show the 
same pattern as the results with TV-news consumption, supporting the results.xiv 
Table 2 around here 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables can be divided into two types of attitude towards 
immigration policy: immigration policy in general and immigration policy concerning 
specific minority groups. The first general index includes questions on allowing 
‘immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe’,xv ‘immigrants of the same 
race/ethnic group as the majority’ and ‘immigrants of different race/ethnic group from 
 
 
the majority’. This index is also divided into two separate indexes for European (same 
ethnic group) and non-European (different ethnic group) immigrants.xvi Finally, three 
items, which are used ‘as is’, ask about the immigration of Muslims, Jews and Roma. 
All these survey questions about immigration had the following possible answers: 
‘Allow many to come and live here’, ‘Allow some’, ‘Allow a few’ and ‘Allow none’. 
Both the questions and the indexes are recoded from 0 to 1 so that a positive value 
indicates support for immigration. 
Results 
The results from the analyses of the mean differences in the countries outside 
France are printed in table 2, and they show a clear effect of the attacks on attitudes 
towards immigration. Beginning with effects on the general immigration policy index 
(left-most column), the attacks caused a negative reaction (significant at the .05 level). 
The effect is at around -0.07 on a scale from 0 to 1. To determine if the results are 
dependent on the types of immigration and groups considered, the second and third 
columns display the results from analyses of attitudes towards immigration from within 
and outside the EU. The attacks reduced support for immigration from both groups 
outside France, and both effects are statistically significant. The last three columns in 
the table show the effects on attitudes towards the immigration of more specific ethnic 
and religious groups. These columns do not show the expected pattern; while there is a 
negative effect on support for Muslim immigration, there is also a negative effect on 
support for Jewish immigration. There are, however, no effects on attitudes towards 
Roma immigration. 
Table 3 around here 
The effect estimates for France are displayed in table 3, and the estimated 
 
 
difference is negative for all groups, except for Jewish immigration. However, none of 
the results are statistically significant, and the effects are smaller than those for the other 
countries—consistently at around -0.02. For Jewish immigration, the estimate is 
positive at .02, but it is not statistically significant. The table’s last row displays one-
sided significance tests for the effect to be significantly more negative outside France. 
These tests illustrate that the change in attitudes towards Jewish immigration is 
significantly less negative in France than in the other countries. (The estimate for EU 
countries is also significant at .1.) Thus, so far, the results indicate that the attacks 
negatively affected attitudes towards different types of immigration outside France, but 
that there was no such effect within France. 
Table 4 around here 
However, comparing the absolute differences in means may underestimate the 
differences in effects because the non-French respondents were relatively more negative 
towards immigration from the outset. Tables 4 and 5 present the relative difference in 
means. These estimates can be interpreted as the percentage change in attitudes. The 
effect sizes outside France are now around -10 %, with the exception of Muslim 
immigration, which is -17 %. There are also some changes in the estimated 
significances, and, while the change in support for immigration from EU countries is 
significant at .05, the changes in support for immigration policy in general, and towards 
Muslim immigration in particular, are significant at .1. The other estimates are not 
statistically significant. Thus, the change from absolute to relative difference modifies 
the picture. Attitudes towards Muslim immigration are affected the most by the 
attacks—between one and a half times to two times the size of the effect on attitudes 
towards other types of immigration outside France. The differences between France and 
the other European countries are now significant for both Muslim and Jewish 
 
 
immigration (at 0.1 and 0.05 respectively). They continue to be significant for 
immigration from EU countries (at .1), but not for other attitudes. Thus, France seems to 
have had a significantly less negative reaction towards both Jewish and Muslim 
immigration than the other countries after the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks.  
Table 5 around here 
To test how this effect is correlated with TV-news use, attitudes towards the 
immigration of Muslims are regressed on all the control variables described above and a 
variable for watching TV-news. The main interest here is a three-way interaction 
between TV-news watching, being interviewed before or after the attacks and living in 
France. The marginal effects of the attacks are shown in figure 1 for different levels of 
TV-news use and for both France and the other countries.xvii Respondents who do not 
watch TV-news seem to change in a more negative way than others outside France, 
though people who watch TV-news do not become less negative towards immigration 
than others; the interaction with being from France is not significantly different from the 
results in the other countries. However, the interaction estimates are in the opposite 
direction, cancelling out the estimated correlation between news use and attitudes. 
Running the regression with only the French respondents does not reveal a change in 
the correlation between news use and immigration attitudes after the attacks. This 
correlation also holds for Jewish immigration but not for immigration policy in general 
(see table 11). 
Figure 1 around here 
Discussion 
This paper presented three hypotheses concerning the effects of the Charlie 
Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks on immigration policy preferences. Drawing on the 
 
 
findings of earlier literature, the attacks were expected to negatively affect attitudes 
towards immigration policy (H1a), and this effect was expected to be stronger for 
people exposed to more news of the attacks (H1b). However, because of the lack of 
connection between the attacks and immigration policy in the media framing, the 
second hypothesis was the exact opposite of the first. People were expected to become 
less negative the more they were exposed to the coverage of the attacks (H2). Finally, it 
was expected that the emphasis on Republican values in France might prime people to 
be more tolerant and lead to a less negative reaction to the attacks (H3).  
To some extent, the results here support H1a and earlier findings of a negative 
reaction towards immigration after terrorist attacks. The respondents outside France did 
become more negative towards immigration following the attacks, a negative effect 
present across different types of immigration and stronger but not confined to Muslim 
immigration. While this could be attributed to higher degrees of out-group derogation 
after terrorist attacks (see, e.g., Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006), it 
seems probable that the attacks reduced support for immigration in general, affecting 
more specific subtypes as well. 
However, this negative finding is not the only effect present in the data, 
moderating the expected relationship between terrorism and attitudes. It is possible to 
interpret the lack of effect in France and the reduced effect among people who watched 
TV-news outside of France as caused by the media’s free speech frame (H2) and 
coverage of the tolerant reaction from the French public and politicians (H3). Since 
there was less media coverage of the French politicians and demonstrations outside 
France and the French Republican values may not have resonated outside the country 
(Shen and Edwards 2005), a simple solution would be to reduce this finding to an effect 
of the media’s free speech frame (H2). Accordingly, the media framing of the attacks 
 
 
led people, both in France and other countries, to see the attacks as of little relevance to 
immigration policy; therefore, the attacks did not change their immigration preferences. 
Such framing effects depend on people’s exposure and attention to the frame 
(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 14). Thus, media exposure is central, and a correlation 
between media use and the effects of the attacks was found for respondents outside 
France, supporting a framing effect. However, the lack of such a correlation in France 
may point to a simpler mechanism behind the French reaction. As argued in the 
introduction, the French media’s coverage of politicians and demonstrators espousing 
tolerance as the correct reaction to the attacks may have had a priming effect on the 
French public. Priming effects are thought to be less dependent on attention than 
framing effects, and they are less dependent on the amount of media exposure. Being in 
France in the aftermath of the attacks may have, in itself, been enough for this kind of 
effect. While the two effects, priming and framing, cannot be separated in the analyses 
presented here, the results seem to support both of these mechanisms simultaneously.  
Further studies should consider frame setting after terrorism (Scheufele 2004), 
examining why certain values are chosen and emphasised over others and why terrorism 
is made relevant for certain political issues and not others. Studying what, and who, 
determines framing choices after acts of terrorism could give important insights into the 
mechanisms behind the effects of terrorism. In the case of the attacks studied here, the 
media seems to have played a distinct role in setting the dominant framing (see Nacos et 
al. 2011 for examples of how the American media contributed to the framing of 9/11). 
Reactions to terrorism often highlight values that are perceived as characteristic of the 
national community (Sinkkonen 2016; Abrahms 2018); the French Republican 
nationalism, with its emphasis on citizenship rather than lineage and ethnicity, may 
have facilitated France’s relatively tolerant reaction. However, the choice of values is 
 
 
not given in advance, and there are usually different values of national relevance that 
may be evoked by political entrepreneurs. Indeed, in France, the former leader of the 
Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, tweeted that he was not ‘Charlie Hebdo’ but rather 
‘Charlie Martel’, the Frankish king known for beating back the Muslim invasion in the 
Battle of Tours in 738 (Provost 2015). Thus, even in France, other values and frames 
were available after the attacks, and both the specific values that are chosen and how 
they are, in turn, framed (Nelson et al. 2015), may depend on actions by the elite and 
media following attacks.  
This paper has tested a novel approach to the RD method, using the as-if-
random assumption. This method relies on explicit tests of balance rather than on 
parametrical modelling. This is especially useful in the context of natural experiments 
that use survey timing, as there is little reason to believe that time has a direct influence 
on the dependent variable. Thus, balance becomes a more central concern, and 
parametrical modelling may cause more problems than it solves. This paper has also 
shown how geographical information can be further exploited to increase balance. By 
using smaller geographical units, it was possible to achieve higher levels of balance and 
more plausible identification of the randomisation of the interview timing. The resulting 
balanced dataset used here is much more limited than those used in similar studies. 
Since balance is essential, it is not possible to use as much information as can be used in 
other approaches to RD. However, the imbalances in the unused data also make the 
applicability of other approaches questionable, especially regarding the extent to which 
researchers using these approaches were able to parametrically redress those 
imbalances. 
This paper has followed Kinder’s (2007) call for more studies of media effects 
in real-world settings. As is evident from the analyses, studying a real-world setting is 
 
 
more complex than studying an experimental one. While the different country contexts 
offer a certain amount of control over exposure to media coverage, the media effects 
and the mechanisms behind them soon become both complex and intertwined. The 
question of whether the free speech frame or the tolerance prime was decisive for the 
Paris attacks’ lack of effect on immigration attitudes in France remains an open one. In 
addition, while the emphasis on Republican values in France may be seen as a framing 
of the attacks, it has been argued here that this may have had a priming effect on the 
French public. In their criticism of the framing concept’s vagueness, Cacciatore et al. 
(2016) could be interpreted as arguing for only studies of equivalence frames (i.e., 
frames where all the information is kept the same), but developing research on other 
media effects is necessary for the real-world application of this literature’s insights. As 
this paper has shown, researching different types of media effect in one study is possible 
and may yield interesting results. 
While not everyone ‘became Charlie’ after the attacks, the free speech frame 
and the Republican values focused on in the media coverage seem to have affected a 
considerable group both in France and other European countries. Thus, the 
consequences of terrorist attacks are not independent of the media’s coverage of them. 
The framing and priming of terrorist attacks by the media may either attenuate the 
consequences of an attack, as in the case of the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher 
attacks, or possibly, in other situations, further strengthen its negative effects. Further 
studies should investigate both these dynamics in other contexts and the preconditions 
for different types of media coverage of terrorism.  
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i The model of framing presented here differs somewhat from the one Chong and Druckman 
(2007) present. In their model, an attitude is the sum of the products of the weights (w) 
and the valence (v) of other considerations. Thus, terrorist attacks increase the weight of 
terrorism and affect attitudes. Their model does not explicitly discuss which issues are 
included in the consideration itself. In the model used here, the weight (w) is seen as 
consisting of two dimensions, accessibility (a) and relevance (r) (i.e., applicability).  
ii This study differs somewhat from most studies of framing effects in that it is not the issue at 
stake (immigration policy) but, rather, a separate consideration (the terrorist attacks) that is 
being framed. Accordingly, some parts of the media coverage that could lead to framing 
effects of terrorism (i.e., the connection to French Republican values) are assumed to have 
priming effects in the context of attitudes towards immigration policy. Immigration policy 
may be framed as connected to terrorism (e.g., the study by Lahav and Courtemanche 
(2012)) or to Republican values (e.g., the study by Nugier et al. (2016)), but that is not the 
case here.  
iii This argument mirrors the findings by Albertson and Gadarian (2015) on the effects of 
anxiety. They find that anxiety caused by perceptions of threat increases policy support for 
safety measures, but only if these measures are perceived as relevant to the threat.  
iv This became a problem for Prime Minister Aznar as it soon became evident that Islamic 
terrorists connected to Al Qaeda perpetrated the attacks and not Basque separatist terrorists 
connected to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). 
v The brothers were not immigrants themselves, but their parents were born in Algeria. In 
coverage from the English-speaking France 24 during the first two weeks after the attacks, 
the attackers’ French citizenship was downplayed, and they were described as foreign or 
Algerian (Połońska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie 2016). 
vi This study uses the seventh round of the European Social Survey (ESS). The data that support 
the findings are available without restrictions for not-for-profit purposes from Norwegian 
Centre for Research Data (NSD) for European Social Survey European Research 
Infrastructure (ESS ERIC) at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org Replication R-code is 
available from the author’s website: http://www.oyvindsolheim.com. 
vii The code from the rdlocrand R-package (Cattaneo et al. 2016) is used and modified to allow 
for blocked sampling and blocked measurement of the means. Replication R-code is 
available online. 
viii The tests are run for gender, age, national income decile, dummy for parents born in country, 





variables could be affected by the attacks (Montgomery et al. 2018). Recent papers have 
controlled for ideology (Castanho Silva 2018) or used ideology (left or right self-
placement) as an independent variable (Brouard et al. 2018). This may be problematic 
here as placement on this scale could be affected by the attacks (for example, because of 
increased conservatism under threat (Nail et al. 2009)); Castanho Silva (2018: table 1) 
does seem to find a right-wing shift after the attacks.  
ix All the samples are balanced in the aggregate as well; see the results of the balance tests in 
table 9 in the appendix. 
x The interviews were not conducted in one region at a time, but most individual interviewers 
only interviewed in one region. Thus, there is reason to believe that the random selection 
of respondents answering before and after the attacks happened at the regional level. This 
study uses the highest regional level where there is more than one region (i.e., The 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 1 or NUTS 2). NUTS is a 
standard for geographical areas in the European Union. 
xi This gives a weighted mean difference, in which each country weighs the same, and each 
region’s weight in each country is based on its number of respondents. Pooling all 
respondents (no weights) and weighting by region so that each region weighs the same 
inside the countries does not give very different results; see tables 6-8. 
xii This varies a bit between the different analyses as the balance tests are run for each of the 
dependent variables separately, and there are differences in the amount missing for each 
dependent variable.  
xiii The date of the attacks, ‘1715’, is set as a seed to facilitate the replication of the results. 
xiv Controlling for political interest by including a similar interaction as the one with TV news 
does not affect the results either (not printed). 
xv The similarly phrased question on allowing immigrants from poorer countries inside Europe 
was not asked in the Czech Republic, and, therefore, it is not included in the analysis. 
xvi The indexes have a high degree of internal consistency, with a Crohnbach’s alpha of 0.88 for 
the general index, 0.86 for the non-European index and 0.76 for the European index. 
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Belgium BE1 30 30 17 17 34 
Czech Republic CZ01 4 6 19 24 43 
Czech Republic CZ03 5 27 59 106 165 
Czech Republic CZ04 10 10 12 31 43 
Czech Republic CZ07 8 8 11 12 23 
Germany DE7 22 27 12 32 44 
Germany DE3 27 28 12 39 51 
Germany DE9 23 24 11 23 34 
Finland FI1 16 22 43 117 160 
The Netherlands NL2 14 25 49 12 61 
Total EU 10 regions 30 30 245 413 658 
       
France FR1 19 19 16 28 44 
France FR4 22 30 25 23 48 
France FR6 19 30 75 37 112 
Total France 3 regions 22 30 116 88 204 
       
 








countries Muslim Jewish Romani 
Estimate -0.069 -0.092 -0.068 -0.072 -0.073 -0.040 
P-value 0.012 0.009 0.015 0.006 0.02 0.212 
N 594 343 596 648 612 649 
Regions 11 7 11 10 11 10 
Countries 5 4 5 5 5 5 
 
1 This is the sample used for the analyses of immigration of Muslims. The samples vary 
somewhat because the selection of bandwidths are run for each of the dependent 












countries Muslim Jewish Romani 
Estimate -0.017 -0.029 -0.010 -0.021 0.022 -0.021 
P-value 0.598 0.366 0.77 0.603 0.524 0.64 
N 197 197 198 198 196 197 
Regions 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value 
(diff) 0.115 0.095 0.102 0.141 0.017 0.359 
 








countries Muslim Jewish Romani 
Estimate -0.098 -0.143 -0.100 -0.170 -0.103 -0.137 
P-value 0.078 0.035 0.116 0.051 0.103 0.198 
N 594 343 596 648 612 649 
Regions 11 7 11 10 11 10 
Countries 5 4 5 5 5 5 
 








countries Muslim Jewish Romani 
Estimate -0.023 -0.040 -0.014 -0.037 0.032 -0.033 
P-value 0.664 0.427 0.831 0.62 0.525 0.731 
N 197 197 198 198 196 197 
Regions 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value 





Table 6. Effects of the attacks on immigration attitudes in five European countries 







countries Muslim Jewish Romani 
Estimate -0.065 -0.092 -0.064 -0.055 -0.055 -0.031 
P-value 0.023 0.012 0.023 0.06 0.085 0.348 
N 594 343 596 648 612 649 
Regions 11 7 11 10 11 10 
Countries 5 4 5 5 5 5 
 








countries Muslim Jewish Romani 





P-value 0.36 0.159 0.553 0.838 0.46 0.55 
N 197 197 198 198 196 197 
Regions 3 3 3 3 3 3 
P-value 
(diff) 0.223 0.175 0.2 0.169 0.041 0.486 
 








countries Muslim Jewish Romani 
Estimate -0.047 -0.073 -0.052 -0.072 -0.032 -0.057 
P-value 0.031 0.021 0.02 0.002 0.171 0.019 
N 594 343 596 648 612 649 
Regions 11 7 11 10 11 10 






































Estimate  -2.65  0.04  -0.10  0.00  0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.05  -0.06  0.01  0.00  
P-Value  0.26  0.58  0.17  0.99  0.44  0.17  0.42  0.39  0.55  0.91  0.96  
Jewish  
Estimate  -0.91  0.04  -0.07  0.10  0.03  -0.03  -0.05  0.02  -0.05  0.00  0.02  
P-Value  0.64  0.47  0.25  0.73  0.50  0.28  0.35  0.57  0.52  0.98  0.62  
Muslim  
Estimate  -0.32  0.05  -0.05  -0.01  0.06  -0.03  -0.06  0.03  -0.01  0.01  0.01  
P-Value  0.85  0.38  0.38  0.96  0.23  0.22  0.23  0.54  0.81  0.88  0.85  
Policy  
Estimate  -0.81  0.04  -0.07  0.12  0.04  -0.03  -0.05  0.02  -0.04  0.00  0.02  
P-Value  0.66  0.48  0.22  0.67  0.46  0.30  0.35  0.57  0.54  0.95  0.73  
Poor 
countries  
Estimate  -0.81  0.04  -0.07  0.12  0.04  -0.03  -0.05  0.02  -0.04  0.00  0.02  
P-Value  0.66  0.48  0.22  0.67  0.46  0.30  0.35  0.57  0.54  0.95  0.73  
Romani  
Estimate  -0.32  0.05  -0.05  -0.01  0.06  -0.03  -0.06  0.03  -0.01  0.01  0.01  





Table 10. Regression results (OLS) from regressing Muslim immigration on TV-news 




 Dependent variable:  Muslim immigration 
 TV-news: 





 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Constant  0.433***  0.097  0.302***  0.769***  0.401***  
 (0.047)  (0.100)  (0.069)  (0.093)  (0.053)  
TV-news  0.070***  0.291***  0.066**  0.0003  0.072***  
 (0.020)  (0.091)  (0.032)  (0.018)  (0.021)  
After attack  -0.046**  -0.225**  -0.080**  -0.012  -0.045**  
 (0.021)  (0.100)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.022)  
TV-news:After attack  0.038*  0.171*  0.016  -0.007  0.035*  
 (0.020)  (0.102)  (0.018)  (0.028)  (0.021)  
After attack:France  0.037  0.320*  0.112    
 (0.050)  (0.189)  (0.088)    
TV-news:After attack:France  -0.061  -0.274  -0.032    
 (0.039)  (0.195)  (0.036)    
France  0.083*  0.381***  0.194***    
 (0.043)  (0.130)  (0.073)    
TV-news:France  -0.063**  -0.261*  -0.055    
 (0.029)  (0.135)  (0.037)    
TV use (log)  -0.004  0.003  -0.009  0.052  -0.015  
 (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.036)  (0.022)  
Age (Centered)  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001*  -0.001  -0.001  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
 
 
Female  -0.002  -0.005  -0.011  -0.034  0.007  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.038)  (0.021)  
In paid work  0.013  0.020  0.004  -0.161***  0.042*  
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.045)  (0.025)  
Parents born in country  -0.018  -0.017  -0.012  -0.019  -0.013  
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.040)  (0.030)  
Income (decile)  0.004  0.004  0.003  -0.001  0.005  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.005)  
Education(Upper Secondary as 
baseline)  
     
Less Than Lower Secondary  -0.00002  -0.002  0.008  -0.231***  0.029  
 (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.069)  (0.033)  
Lower Secondary  -0.036  -0.040  -0.027  -0.187**  -0.010  
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.086)  (0.057)  
Advanced Vocational  0.055  0.055  0.065*  -0.050  0.063  
 (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.084)  (0.038)  
Tertiary Education  0.150***  0.157***  0.166***  -0.0004  0.166***  
 (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.073)  (0.036)  
Region CZ0  -0.315***  0.198*  -0.165***   -0.323***  
 (0.039)  (0.116)  (0.062)   (0.041)  
Region DE3  0.273***  0.273***  0.261**   0.271***  
 (0.056)  (0.047)  (0.103)   (0.058)  
Region DE7  0.126***  0.601***  0.307***   0.126**  
 (0.048)  (0.214)  (0.079)   (0.051)  





 (0.051)  (0.278)  (0.105)   (0.054)  
Region FI1  -0.066*  0.522***  0.138**   -0.070*  
 (0.038)  (0.153)  (0.066)   (0.040)  
Region NL2  -0.039  0.052  0.083   -0.038  
 (0.037)  (0.130)  (0.065)   (0.040)  
TV-news:Region CZ0  -0.100***  -0.477***  -0.065*   -0.102***  
 (0.027)  (0.121)  (0.036)   (0.028)  
TV-news:Region DE3  0.069   -0.001   0.072  
 (0.096)   (0.058)   (0.100)  
TV-news:Region DE7  -0.101**  -0.432**  -0.087**   -0.096**  
 (0.043)  (0.218)  (0.043)   (0.045)  
TV-news:Region DE9  -0.078  -0.245  -0.062   -0.075  
 (0.056)  (0.282)  (0.061)   (0.058)  
TV-news:Region FI1  -0.123***  -0.542***  -0.095**   -0.123***  
 (0.032)  (0.157)  (0.038)   (0.034)  
TV-news:Region NL2  -0.032  -0.041  -0.065*   -0.031  
 (0.028)  (0.133)  (0.035)   (0.029)  
Observations  801  801  801  186  615  
R2  0.396  0.397  0.377  0.251  0.411  
Adjusted R2  0.373  0.375  0.354  0.194  0.386  
Note:  p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01  
 
 
Table 11. Regression results (OLS) from regressing support for Jewish immigration and 
immigration policy on log transformed TV-news use 
 Dependent variable:  
 Jewish immigration  Immigration policy  
 (1)  (2)  
Constant  0.525***  0.539***  
 (0.048)  (0.043)  
TV-news (log)  0.007  0.042**  
 (0.021)  (0.018)  
After attack  -0.049**  -0.050***  
 (0.021)  (0.019)  
TV-news (log):After attack  0.060***  0.022  
 (0.022)  (0.019)  
After attack:France  0.086*  0.020  
 (0.050)  (0.045)  
TV-news (log):After attack:France  -0.064  -0.019  
 (0.040)  (0.036)  
France  0.124***  0.010  
 (0.044)  (0.039)  
TV-news (log):France  0.002  -0.056**  
 (0.029)  (0.026)  
TV use (log)  -0.009  -0.014  
 (0.019)  (0.017)  
Age (Centered)  0.001  -0.001**  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
 
 
Female  0.008  0.034**  
 (0.019)  (0.017)  
In paid work  -0.022  0.011  
 (0.022)  (0.020)  
Parents born in country  -0.024  0.023  
 (0.025)  (0.022)  
Income (decile)  0.0003  0.003  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
Education(Upper Secondary as baseline)    
Less Than Lower Secondary  0.024  -0.003  
 (0.030)  (0.027)  
Lower Secondary  -0.034  0.037  
 (0.048)  (0.042)  
Advanced Vocational  0.056  0.031  
 (0.035)  (0.031)  
Tertiary Education  0.080**  0.094***  
 (0.032)  (0.029)  
Region CZ0  -0.085**  -0.189***  
 (0.040)  (0.035)  
Region DE3  0.335***  0.198***  
 (0.063)  (0.056)  
Region DE7  0.275***  0.101**  
 (0.054)  (0.048)  
Region DE9  0.280***  0.189***  
 (0.057)  (0.051)  
 
 
Region DEE  0.189***  0.118**  
 (0.054)  (0.048)  
Region FI1  0.007  -0.057*  
 (0.039)  (0.034)  
Region NL2  0.067*  -0.069**  
 (0.038)  (0.034)  
TV-news (log):Region CZ0  -0.025  -0.044*  
 (0.027)  (0.024)  
TV-news (log):Region DE3  -0.055  -0.040  
 (0.110)  (0.099)  
TV-news (log):Region DE7  -0.031  -0.027  
 (0.049)  (0.044)  
TV-news (log):Region DE9  -0.029  -0.072  
 (0.064)  (0.057)  
TV-news (log):Region DEE  -0.037  -0.055  
 (0.046)  (0.041)  
TV-news (log):Region FI1  -0.085**  -0.062*  
 (0.039)  (0.035)  
TV-news (log):Region NL2  0.0004  -0.001  
 (0.029)  (0.026)  
Observations  764  747  
R2  0.251  0.281  
Adjusted R2  0.219  0.249  




Table 12. Regression results (OLS) from regressing Muslim immigration on different 
control variables 
 
 Muslim immigration:  
 Control variable:  















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
Constant  0.280***  0.238**  0.381***  0.398  0.458***  0.436***  0.676***  0.332***  
 (0.069)  (0.101)  (0.106)  (0.258)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.083)  (0.043)  
Control  0.029**  0.127**  0.005  0.018  -0.008  -0.038***  -0.268***  0.102***  
 (0.012)  (0.062)  (0.007)  (0.096)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.081)  (0.024)  
After attack  -0.004  0.001  -0.037  -0.100  -0.075*  -0.069***  -0.199**  -0.021  
 (0.049)  (0.058)  (0.082)  (0.200)  (0.043)  (0.021)  (0.091)  (0.036)  
Control:After 
attack  
-0.008  -0.035  -0.002  0.010  0.003  0.020  0.144  -0.029  
 (0.008)  (0.033)  (0.005)  (0.075)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.093)  (0.021)  
After attack:France  -0.032  0.001  0.097  -0.040  0.046  0.058  0.043  -0.011  
 (0.105)  (0.118)  (0.157)  (0.299)  (0.098)  (0.048)  (0.201)  (0.092)  
Control:After 
attack:France  
0.013  0.027  -0.003  0.041  0.003  -0.005  0.012  0.041  
 (0.016)  (0.069)  (0.011)  (0.115)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.207)  (0.050)  
France  0.280***  0.306**  -0.092  -0.105  0.099  0.117***  0.034  0.148**  
 (0.095)  (0.124)  (0.143)  (0.291)  (0.080)  (0.039)  (0.168)  (0.070)  
Control:France  -0.027*  -0.108  0.017*  0.092  0.004  0.019  0.103  -0.040  
 
 
 (0.016)  (0.074)  (0.010)  (0.108)  (0.019)  (0.030)  (0.172)  (0.040)  
TV use (log)  
-
0.016**  
-0.016**  -0.022***  -0.022***     -0.019***  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)     (0.007)  
Age (Centered)  
-
0.001**  
-0.001**  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001**  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Female  -0.023  -0.024  -0.010  -0.009  -0.021  -0.021  -0.023  -0.025  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
Income (decile)    0.005  0.006*  0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.002  




        
Less Than Lower 
Secondary  
-0.021  -0.021    -0.006  -0.005  -0.009  -0.006  
 (0.029)  (0.029)    (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  
Lower Secondary  -0.038  -0.045    -0.046  -0.040  -0.046  -0.033  
 (0.048)  (0.048)    (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.047)  
Advanced 
Vocational  
0.024  0.022    0.038  0.041  0.040  0.034  
 (0.033)  (0.033)    (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  
Tertiary Education  0.145***  0.145***    0.161***  0.156***  0.157***  0.128***  
 (0.031)  (0.030)    (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  
Region CZ0  -0.076  -0.051  -0.266*  -0.341  
-
0.285***  
-0.256***  -0.376**  -0.126***  
 
 
 (0.086)  (0.118)  (0.151)  (0.386)  (0.076)  (0.037)  (0.172)  (0.048)  
Region DE3  0.342***  0.400***  -0.027  -0.699  0.325***  0.277***  0.171  0.235***  
 (0.107)  (0.139)  (0.190)  (0.461)  (0.078)  (0.044)  (0.106)  (0.091)  
Region DE7  0.380***  0.430***  0.069  -0.122  0.274***  0.189***  0.010  0.283***  
 (0.110)  (0.144)  (0.178)  (0.436)  (0.095)  (0.047)  (0.303)  (0.101)  
Region DE9  0.505***  0.543***  0.134  -0.208  0.441***  0.366***  0.347***  0.322***  
 (0.130)  (0.178)  (0.226)  (0.558)  (0.086)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.110)  
Region FI1  0.111  0.165  -0.139  -0.345  -0.050  -0.008  -0.098  -0.004  
 (0.087)  (0.118)  (0.122)  (0.289)  (0.064)  (0.031)  (0.119)  (0.056)  
Region NL2  0.175**  0.191  -0.500***  -1.337***  -0.062  -0.022  -0.237*  0.018  





-0.119*  0.001  0.033  0.006  0.017  0.137  -0.106***  
 (0.014)  (0.070)  (0.011)  (0.147)  (0.015)  (0.028)  (0.175)  (0.036)  
Control:Region 
DE3  
-0.010  -0.068  0.022*  0.374**  -0.012  0.010  0.124  -0.004  





-0.155*  0.009  0.120  -0.030  -0.026  0.179  -0.088*  
 (0.017)  (0.082)  (0.011)  (0.161)  (0.023)  (0.047)  (0.305)  (0.050)  
Control:Region 
DE9  
-0.030  -0.127  0.013  0.200  -0.035*  -0.098   -0.026  
 (0.020)  (0.100)  (0.015)  (0.210)  (0.021)  (0.060)   (0.058)  
Control:Region 
FI1  
-0.021  -0.102  0.010  0.134  0.011  0.019  0.110  -0.017  







-0.117*  0.036***  0.509***  0.011  0.035  0.246*  -0.036  
 (0.014)  (0.068)  (0.010)  (0.135)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.148)  (0.034)  
Observations  843  843  838  838  843  843  843  842  
R2  0.390  0.388  0.382  0.377  0.385  0.389  0.388  0.413  
Adjusted R2  0.371  0.368  0.365  0.360  0.366  0.369  0.369  0.393  
Note:  p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01  
 
 
 
